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Elements of the Law

low of a study not only of cases but of the institution which is
controlled by the cases, both will be augmented and enriched.'
Edward Levi had tried to set himself off from the more extreme
Realists in an essay published in 1938 entitled The Natural Law,
Precedent,and Thurman Arnold." Arnold was, like Jerome Frank, one

of the more rhetorically bellicose Realists, and his books, The Symbols of Government4 and The Folklore of Capitalism,3 were central
tracts in the later days of the Realist episode. In patient and selfconscious steps, Levi accused Arnold of being a closet natural lawyer
whose descriptions of legal reasoning tended to the mystical and
whose prescriptions were circular.6 Although Levi claimed to be reconciling three "approaches to law"-natural law, precedent, and the

"Thurman Arnold way" 27-the essay in fact anticipates in argument

and presentation his famous monograph, published a decade later, as
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning.-

In Levi's hands, then, the Levi-Steffen materials used for the first
time in 1937 for Elements were a sustained dose of anti-Realism, at
least in its most flamboyant forms. The materials introduced students
to basic principles and concepts of the Anglo-American customary le-

gal system, emphasizing two overriding themes: the influence of social
and political theory outside the legal system on the system's behavior,
and the incremental, sometimes un-self-conscious, development of
new legal principles." If the traditional emphasis in first-year law
school courses was on the science of making deductions from legal

rules, the Levi-Steffen approach taught that the important problems
in law involved making a "choice between rules,"' and doing so in a

Id at 408.
Edward H. Levi, The Natural Law, Precedent,and Thurman Arnold, 24 Va L Rev 587,
587-88 (1938).
24
Thurman W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government (Yale 1935).
25 .Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism(Yale 1937).
26
See Levi, 24 Va L Rev at 604-12 (cited in note 23).
27 Id at 587.
28
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago 1948).
29
See Levi, 24 Va L Rev at 608 (cited in note 23):
We may say that there is a fairly certain structure of the law because judges will not frequently mean to invent concepts or change old ones. If anything, they mean not to do so. It
is for this reason that the law can change while the judges and lawyers insist that it does
not. The concepts change with the social order without our knowing it; new concepts come
in without our realizing it. In the main this is as it should be. It gives the law its ability to
change and yet remain consistent. It is also the reason why judges should not be particularly bright, or they would change the law consciously too frequently.
22
23

30
Letter from Levi to Hutchins (Sept 7, 1938), Presidential Papers, Box 113, JRL (discussing Steffen's call for "[a]n awareness that the important problems in the law do not involve deductions from the legal rules but a choice between rules-a choice which Steffen sometimes
speaks of as being 'philosophical"').
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deliberate, disciplined fashion that avoided the artificial mysteries or
conclusory certitude of the "Thurman Arnold way."
The affinity between Steffen and Levi suggests that Chicago
would have been a natural place for Steffen and Elements a natural
course for him to teach, and, indeed, Levi tried to recruit Steffen. Or
rather Robert Maynard Hutchins added Steffen to the growing list of
Yale faculty members he tried to recruit during the 1930s in order to
enhance the stature of the Law School. He offered Charles Clark, his
successor as Dean, $25,000 ($255,455 in 2001 dollars) to leave New
Haven, but Clark turned him down.31 William 0. Douglas technically
joined the Chicago faculty for the academic year 1931-32 at a salary
of $20,000 ($204,364 in 2001 dollars), although he was on leave in
Washington, D.C., and Clark managed to secure a Sterling Professorship and substantial salary increase in order to lure him back.32 Douglas and Hutchins plotted together to lure other Yale faculty members
to Chicago (principally Wesley Sturges, Walton Hamilton, and Underhill Moore), but the planning apparently never proceeded past the
brainstorming stage. Levi wrote Hutchins a thirteen-page, singlespaced memorandum in the fall of 1938 that evaluated Steffen's professional writings since 1930 with an obvious eye toward a lateral appointment 3 Steffen remained at Yale until 1949 when he was appointed to the John P Wilson Professorship at Chicago, much to the
(publicly reported) dismay of the Dean of Yale Law School." Hutchins's only successful attempt to raid Yale before World War II was
Friedrich Kessler, whom Levi had recommended to him when he returned from his post-graduate year at Yale. Kessler joined the faculty
in 1939, became a full professor in 1943, but returned to Yale in 1947,
largely for financial reasons.
World War II dramatically affected the Law School and the University as a whole. Enrollment in all units fell, university facilities
were utilized for military and related training, and the future of the
31 See Laura Kalman, From Realism to Pluralism: Theory and Education at Yale Law
School, 1927-1960 348 (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 1982).
32
Id at 345, 347. Part of the reason Douglas left was that Hutchins could not deliver the
promised salary and could offer only $15,000. Id at 347. Compare William O. Douglas, Go East,
Young Man: The Early Years 163-64 (Random House 1974) (Douglas said the figure was
$25,000, but there is no evidence that Hutchins promised more than $20,000).
33 See Letter from Levi to Hutchins (Sept 7, 1938) (cited in note 30).
34 Dean Sturges's annual report said:

The attractiveness of that chair-and especially the generous stipend which it provides for
the incumbent-left Yale no practical basis upon which to exercise the amenities of competition which usually attend similar situations. Professor Steffen was the seventh among
our faculty who were approached during the year with offers by other law schools. Only by
his resignation have our ranks been broken. We regret his leaving.
Yale University, Bulletin of Yale University Law School: Report of the Dean 1948-1949, Ser 45,
No 17,12 (1949).
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institution became clouded. Generous salaries and raids on other faculties became distant memories almost overnight. Teaching loads increased markedly, and the University struggled to keep afloat financially. In the fall of 1940, Edward Levi relinquished Elements to
Kessler, who taught the course until 1944. Levi explained the change
to Hutchins a few months earlier in a confidential memorandum in
which he reported that his Spring Quarter course load included
"Elements of the Law, Risk (which you knew as Agency); Philosophy
of Law; Bankruptcy and Reorganization, and Moot Court" 35-a total
of 22 class hours per week, not counting tutorial responsibilities for
first-year students. "This situation is not good for me nor for anyone
else."3 Hutchins responded with characteristic dash and buoyancy: "I
have learned with regret that you are not working hard enough. Mr.
Adler and I will be glad to turn over to you the class which we are
scheduled to teach in [the] Law School next year in order to round
out your program."37
Enrollment trends in the Law School became grave as the war
progressed, and Hutchins could not disguise the fact with either eloquence or flippancy. In the academic year in which he taunted Levi,
the Law School conferred 53 degrees; three years later, at the conclusion of the 1942-43 school year, the number had plummeted to nine.3
There was a serious question whether the University could afford to
continue to operate the Law School in that posture. Hutchins mulled
closing the School; he also considered papering over the maneuver by
announcing a "merger" with the Social Sciences Division, to be explained, no doubt, by a forest of rhetoric about intellectual synergies,
cooperative research, and interdivisional activity. The law faculty took
a more practical, and personal, perspective on the question. Led by
Sheldon Tefft and William Winslow Crosskey, they sought clarification
from Hutchins of whether the University would honor their contracts
"if the Law School is closed."39 Hutchins temporized, but after two
months of worrying, he gambled and sent a memo to Tefft assuring
the faculty that "the Law School will be kept open and the salaries of
the staff paid" during the following academic year. '° Enrollments continued to lag and did not return to pre-war levels until the 1946-47
35 Letter from Levi to Hutchins (undated), Box 113, Presidential Papers, JRL.

Id.
Text of telephone message from Hutchins to Levi (Mar 6, 1940), Box 113, Presidential
Papers, JRL.
38
I am grateful to Eric Pittenger, Registrar of the Law School, for verifying these figures
and confirming them with the Registrar of the University.
39 Letter from Wilber G. Katz to Hutchins (Jan 8, 1943), Box 113, Presidential Papers,
JRL.
40 Letter from Hutchins to Sheldon Tefft (Mar 12, 1943), Box 113, Presidential Papers,
JRL.
36

37
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academic year. In 1945, Levi reclaimed his franchise on the Elements
course, even though Kessler continued on the faculty for two more
years.
After what can fairly be called a near-death experience during
the war, the Law School was reinvigorated by the post-war boom. Enrollments surged, spurred by the G. I. Bill. The entering class for 194647 was allowed to reach 125,4' and that meant new faculty had to be
hired as the returning veterans began to spread out over the entire
curriculum. The losses of three senior professors-Kessler (to Yale),
George Bogert (emeritus), and Charles 0. Gregory (to Virginia)meant that several courses were understaffed or not covered: torts, labor law, trusts, commercial law, legal history, and international law.
Hutchins was willing to add one, and possibly two, senior faculty
members to meet the shortfall, so the Committee on Additions to the
Faculty recommended to Hutchins the appointment of "two of the
following persons: Professor David Cavers of Harvard, Professor
3
Roscoe Steffen of Yale, Professor Friedrich Kessler of Yale." Only
Steffen came, but the appointment made a splash in the profession
because it was said that no chaired member of the Yale law faculty
had ever left to accept appointment at another law school.
More significant changes in staffing and teaching were on the
way. Over the private but fierce objections of some anti-Semitic trustees," Hutchins appointed Edward Levi Dean of the Law School in
1950. Levi, hoping to capitalize on the momentum that began to build
with Steffen's appointment, immediately took two steps that promthe ap-5
ised to enlarge the School's national profile. He engineered
faculty,
the
to
Mentschikoff
Soia
and
pointment of Karl Llewellyn
and he convinced Hutchins to authorize twenty one-year, full-tuition
to
scholarships to students entering the Law School in 1951 in order
pool.4
application
the
of
diversity
geographic
and
improve the quality
41 See Letter from Wilber G. Katz to Ernest C. Colwell (June 5, 1946), Box 24, Presidential
Papers, JRL (discussing the need for an addilional faculty member as a result of the increased
enrollment).
The four-year curriculum was voted out of existence by the faculty in January of 1949,
42
and all entering students from the autumn of 1949 were subject to a unitary three-year program
of 48 required quarter hours (only six of which were elective) to attain an LL.B. degree. An optional "fourth year of advanced and specialized work" was offered to attain a J.D. degree. University of Chicago Law School, Announcement of Revised Program,1949-50.
43 Report of the Committee on Additions to the Faculty,10 March 1949, Presidential Papers,
Ser 1945-50, Box 42, JRL (unanimously adopted by the faculty).
44 See Shils, Portraitsat 143-44 (cited in note 2).
45
See Robert Whitman, Soia Mentschikoff and Karl Llewellyn: Moving Together to the
University of Chicago Law School, 24 Conn L Rev 1119 (1992). Levi conditioned his acceptance
of the deanship on receiving authority to appoint three senior members to the faculty. Shortly
after Llewellyn and Mentschikoff were appointed, Allison Dunham-like Llewellyn, also on the
Columbia law faculty-was named professor of law effective July 1, 1951.
46 See Letter from Levi to Central Administration (Nov 1, 1950), Presidential Papers, Ser
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Llewellyn was 57 years old and had taught at Columbia Law School
since 1925 after six years at Yale, his alma mater. He was now bestknown not as the author of The Bramble Bush, but as the chief reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code. Mentschikoff, 45, was the
assistant chief reporter for the Code and his third wife. Both had held
visiting positions at Harvard Law School in 1948-49, but antinepotism rules precluded their joint appointment there; Columbia
had a similar policy. Levi finessed Chicago's comparable policy by appointing Mentschikoff as "Professorial Lecturer," a position under the
Statutes of the University that did not implicate anti-nepotism policies.'7
The appointments of Llewellyn and Mentschikoff, combined with
the earlier appointment of Steffen, were designed to identify the Law
School as a center for the study of commercial law on an international
basis.4 But Llewellyn was also nationally prominent in legal theory
(his chair at Columbia was the Betts Professorship of Jurisprudence),
and he had one of the most sustained records in the profession of
writing on legal education. 9 With Levi now occupied by the deanship,
Llewellyn was the natural choice to teach Elements. Indeed, perhaps
he should be described as the "irresistible" choice, notwithstanding
the facts that Levi had just published his classic monograph, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, and that the Levi-Steffen materials

had now reached a fourth edition and had been published by the University of Chicago Press."0 As anyone knows who has ploughed
through The Bramble Bush, let alone heard or seen him in action,
Llewellyn was a self-styled force of nature -exuberant, rambunctious,
taunting, inspirational, and sometimes exasperatingly obscure. By the
time he arrived in Chicago, the Realist moment had passed, and the
firebrands of the 1930s had become domesticated, as Deans (Wesley
Sturges), wealthy lawyers (Thurman Arnold), and even judges

1945-50, Box 42, JRL. Levi pointed out that applications were beginning to decline after the
post-war rise, that some admitted students were withdrawing due to "insufficient funds," and
that the "geographical distribution of the students [was] extremely poor."
47 See Whitman, 24 Conn L Rev at 1127-28 (cited in note 45).
48 See Letter from Edward H. Levi to Lawrence A. Kimpton (Apr 4,1957), Dean's Office
Files (Karl N. Llewellyn), University of Chicago Law School.
49 See, for example, Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J Legal
Educ 211,219 (1948); Karl N. Llewellyn, Lawyer's Ways and Mean.%and the Law Curriculum,30
Iowa L Rev 333,335 (1945); K.N. Llewellyn, McDougal and Lasswell Plan for Legal Education,
43 Colum L Rev 476, 480-81 (1943); K.N. Llewellyn, On the Problem of Teaching "Private"Law,
54 Harv L Rev 775,779-80 (1941); Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Why ofAmerican Legal Education,
4 Duke Bar Assn J 19, 19 (Winter 1936); K.N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 Colum L Rev 651,665-78 (1935).
50 Roscoe T. Steffen and Edward H. Levi, Elements of the Law (Chicago 4th ed 1950). Earlier mimeographed editions bore copyrights of 1936,1938, and 1946.
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(Jerome Frank).51 Llewellyn, by contrast, was unreconstructed: He no
longer preached Realism- at least in print--but he continued to practice it, and Elements of the Law was the perfect podium for him.
The materials Llewellyn used for his brand of Elements could
52
not have been more different from the Levi-Steffen materials. None
of the classic philosophers appeared in the mimeographed materials;
they comprised only cases, and principally cases from one jurisdiction-New York State. The cases covered different topics, such as "indefiniteness" in contracts, warranties, or the law of foreign remittances, but the subject matter was incidental. For Llewellyn, the purpose of the course was to teach the craft of lawyering. To do that, he
tried to create an almost clinical atmosphere in the classroom. Students would treat cases as problems, often taking the side of plaintiff
or defendant, and then try to provide advice or to develop arguments
to present to courts should the problem become a case or the case become a decision to be appealed. Thus, the single jurisdiction was essential to the teaching strategy: Students needed to "learn the law"or appreciate its ambiguities and gaps-in order to work out their
"advice." As Llewellyn inimitably explained on the second day of
class in 1955:
I call your attention to one thing, however, that distinguishes this
assignment of cases from any other that you have had--you will
have noticed that all of this set of cases come from a single court
in a single state. And with this change in order, you will note that
they occur in time sequence. The effect of this is that you are, as
you work into the series of cases, coming to see them with pretty
much the same eyes with which the lawyers and the respective
courts saw the cases. The bulk of what has, gone before is in your
hands as you approach the case. And we can start to work over
what it is the court was doing and the lawyers were doing case by
case, and see what the process was that was going on. We are
studying primarily in these cases the process. What was the lawyers' job and how did they perform it? What was the court's job
and how did it perform it? And we see a new job coming up-the
eternal problem of the court is with us; no matter how much you
51 See, for example, Robert Jerome Glennon, The Iconoclast as Reformer: Jerome Frank's
Impact on the Law chs 4-6 (Cornell 1985).
52 An edition of the materials was eventually published as Soia Mentschikoff and Irwin P.
Stotzky, The Theory and Craft of American Law- Elements (Matthew Bender 1981). For a critical view by two sympathetic teachers of the materials, see Leslie E. Gerwin and Paul M. Shupack, Karl Llewellyn's Legal Method Course: Elements of Law and Its Teaching Materials,33 J
Legal Educ 64, 74-93 (1983). For a taste of Llewellyn in the classroom, see The Adventures of
Rollo, 2 U Chi L Sch Rec No 1 (1953), reprinted in Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist
Movement at 151 (cited in note 9).
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have got done a new one is coming up tomorrow. And we see the
new ones come up and see the3 court use their old machinery for
the purpose of dealing with it.1
Although law schools were beginning to emphasize theory over
rules in the classroom, Llewellyn remained as fixed in the 1950s as he
had been thirty years before on the imperative of teaching "skills,"
even in large first-year classes. In his view, first-year courses were often confused by the combination of substance and what he called
"craft-skills" being taught from the same casebooks.
His solution was

not without its own problems, however. As two experienced secondgeneration teachers of the materials explain:
The presentation of the material in this form, in a course whose
name revealed neither its content nor purpose, to students hungry for knowledge and direction, raised difficult questions of
pedagogy for the instructor and created a tendency on the part
of students to treat Elements as an afterthought to their apparently more relevant substantive courses.55
Worse, Llewellyn tended to overload his intellectual agenda for

the course without clear indication to his students of when he was
changing focus. At one minute, he was emphasizing "craft-technical"
skills, at another "area-policy" questions ("Is-It-Wise? Is-It-Right?
(not 'right' contrasted with 'legally incorrect', [sic] but 'right' contrasted with 'evil')"), and at another, questions of "general jurisprudence. 5 6 Compounding the problem was Llewellyn's tendency to pro-

claim, without much elaboration, that the "arts of the legal crafts"
were imbued with "deep truths about man's nature and man's life
with his fellowman.' 7 To top it off, the materials and class presenta53 Transcript, Elements of the Law, Lecture I (Oct 4, 1955), Karl Llewellyn Papers (KLP)
at C, N, 2, 3-4 (JRL) (The citation format used for citations to the Llewellyn Papers is set out in
Raymond M. Ellinwood, Jr., and William L. Twining, The Karl Llewellyn Papers:A Guide to the
Collection (Chicago 1970).
54 Shortly before joining the faculty, he wrote, somewhat wishfully:
There is an increasing body of opinion in the law schools to the effect that if the various legal craft-skills now inculcated by indirection in the first-year case-classes were made the
explicit focus of the first year, we should be able to bring every student who remains in the
school into the opening of the second year already trained to read judicial decisions and to
use them with some professional competence.
Llewellyn, 1 J Legal Educ at 216 (cited in note 49).
55 Gerwin and Shupack, 33 J Legal Educ at 83 (cited in note 52).
56 Llewellyn, Materialsfor Elements, 1952-53, KLP at M, I, l(a) (JRL) (cited in note 53).
57 Defending the "craft-skills" emphasis against the developing theoretical trend in
American law schools, he wrote in 1958:
With the waning of apprenticeship the arts of the legal crafts slipped into the forgotten or
into disrepute; either they were wholly neglected or they were seen in terms not of deep
truths about man's nature and man's life with his fellowman, but as matters of shallow and

HeinOnline -- 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147 2003

The University of Chicago Law Review

[70:141

tions were supplemented by required readings-plural-of The
Bramble Bush, and, depending on the year, at least one reading of
Levi's Introduction to Legal Reasoning. From time to time, guest lec-

turers addressed the class, but Llewellyn's efforts to enlist fellow firstyear teachers in coordinating their presentations with his were routinely if politely declined.m
Karl Llewellyn taught Elements from 1951 until 1961, a few
months before his death. Harry Kalven, who tended to take a more
historically-oriented approach to the course, and Edward Levi split
the teaching duties in 1962, and Harry W. Jones, visiting from Columbia, taught the course in 1963." Then Mentschikoff took over her late
husband's materials and the course from 1964 to 1973, ' after which
she left the Law School to become Dean of the University of Miami
Law School. The franchise was intact, at least symbolically, but much
of the energy had gone out of the enterprise. Mentschikoff dutifully
worked through the materials, but her passion seemed uneven and her
final examinations often included an hour of true/false questions,
which struck many students as undermining the emphasis on craft and
nuance developed by the materials and the class. Nonetheless, both
she and Llewellyn "inspired countless students,"6 either by their enthusiasm and warmth, or by quiet acts of kindness in an often forbidding world. Nor was their long-term influence negligible. Geof Stone
attributes Mentschikoff's Elements, which he took in 1968, as the inspiration for his seminar, Constitutional Decision Making, which year
in and out has won praise from students for its challenging structure-writing judicial opinions tabula rasa,based only on the text, followed by application of the precedents developed from scratch to new
situations.
Mentschikoff's departure posed somewhat of a quandary for the
curriculum. In an academic ethos growingly committed to theory and
in a profession struggling to develop sensible critiques to the explooften ignoble artifice and trickery.
Karl N. Llewellyn, Chicago,The Advancement of the Law, 3 Student Law No 4, 16, 17 (1958).
58 For example, at the beginning of the 1952-1953 academic year, Llewellyn circulated his
reading assignments for the first months of Elements to the other first-year faculty inviting
"[a]ny coordination you can suggest with your own course." None responded. Llewellyn's description of the course's objective was classic: "The classwork will concentrate on the lawyer's
job of patient accuracy in being effective for his cause, and on drill in technical analysis directed
to a sharp purpose." Letter from Llewellyn to First Year Faculty (Oct 2, 1952), KLP at Q, V, 1
(JRL) (cited in note 53).
59 Jones eventually published an introductory casebook, Harry W. Jones, John M. Kernochan, and Arthur W. Murphy, Legal Method: Cases and Text Materials (Foundation 1980).
60 With two qualifications: Kalven taught the course in 1966, and he taught a small section
of the course in 1969 using Spencer Kimball's HistoricalIntroduction to the Legal System (West
1966).
Whitman, 24 Conn L Rev at 1125 n 24 (cited in note 45).
61
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sion of public law two decades after Brown v Board of Education2
revolutionized aspirations for the Constitution, "craft-skills" sounded
dated or pedestrian. Dean Phil Neal taught Elements in 1975, and future Dean Gerhard Casper filled in the following year, but the course
fell out of the curriculum in 1976. Then Edward Levi returned from
his service as Attorney General and took up the course again from
1977 to 1983. During that period, and following his formal retirement
in 1984, he worked steadily to revise the Levi-Steffen materials, which
had last been modified in 1950, but he never settled on a final version
before his death.
Cass Sunstein taught the course for the first time in 1985, and
David Strauss did so the following year. Since 1993, they have both
taught the course, each to half of the entering class, on an annual basis. Their courses still treat the problem of reasoning by analogy in the
case law system, but also touch on larger themes that students will encounter throughout the curriculum such as the tension between rules
and discretion, the conflict between coercion and autonomy, and the
recurrent mysteries of "interpretation." Sunstein emphasizes questions about the meanings of liberty and equality, the proper role of
judicial review (he tends to focus on Lochner v New York and the
problems of constitutional "baselines"), and, recently, rationality and
behavioral economics. Strauss begins his course with a line of common law cases that Levi employed in his Introduction and then compares the developments in those cases with the argument in Benjamin
N. Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process.m The underlying
theme in both sections of the course during the past decade is nicely
captured in the title of Sunstein's 1996 monograph, Legal Reasoning
and PoliticalConflict.65
Assessing the effect of American Legal Realism on the Yale Law
School between the World Wars, John Henry Schlegel quipped in
1979, "[C]urriculum reform at Yale proceeded in the time-honored
way with the acquisition of new faculty members who brought new
courses with them and the departure of old faculty members who
took their old courses away."'' The experience at Chicago with respect
to Elements is more a twice-told tale, with Edward Levi trying to provide a philosophical and pedagogical antidote to Realism before the
war, with Llewellyn and Mentschikoff trying to plant Realist peda62
63

347 US 483 (1954).
198 US 45 (1905). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev

873 (1987).
64 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale 1921). See also Grant
Gilmore, The Ages ofAmerican Law 74-78 (Yale 1977).
65 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and PoliticalConflict (Oxford
1996).
66 John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and EmpiricalSocial Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 Buff L Rev 459,480 (1979).
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gogy in the theory-thickening air of Hyde Park, and finally Levi restoring the introductory course to true north. To some extent, the syllabi support that interpretation, notwithstanding that Levi's Introduction to Legal Reasoning was routinely a common text, regardless of
the instructor, from 1949, when it was published, until Levi's retirement thirty-five years later. The disparity between the two approaches
could not be greater. Levi's materials included numerous excerpts
from classical philosophy, including, for example, Plato, Hobbes,
Locke, Engels, Hans Kelsen, Savigny, Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics,
Politics, Rhetoric), St. Thomas Aquinas, and H.L.A. Hart (and that's
just in the first 200 pages of almost 1200 pages of photocopied materials which also included case law). Llewellyn included no philosophy,
only cases. Even the edition of the materials that were eventually pub67
lished posthumously under Mentschikoff's direction adds only notes
or the occasional essay by a lawyer (often Llewellyn) or a judge; formal philosophy is entirely absent. Levi had broad and deep ambitions
for his course; Llewellyn, aiming to produce "lawyers' lawyers," was
extremely narrow, notwithstanding frequent grand asides and ringing
maxims.
I think there are deeper commonalities between the courses, despite their sharp differences in focus, scope, and tone. The congruence
lies in their mutual hostility to the extreme, almost nihilistic strain of
Legal Realism,68 and in the corresponding optimism about the capacity of a customary legal system to develop workable rules for concrete
problems. To some extent, Arthur Linton Corbin, who spent half a
century preaching that message, was the Godfather of Elements of
the Law. Since his days as a student at Yale Law School, Karl Llewellyn viewed Corbin as his "father in the law";" for decades, letters
7
from Llewellyn to Corbin began, "Dear Dad." In a letter to Llewellyn late in both their lives, Corbin recounted his "fight for life as a
law teacher" during the dizzy height of Realism:
Probably 1928, when I had to drive a good beginning class to
study the Law of Contracts, against the competition in their
other courses of Bob Hutchins, Lee Tulin, and Leon Green, all
three telling these beginners that there is no "law," only separate
cases-that each decision is a "chigger" decision or a stomach
burp-that there are no organized molecules, only individual at67

See note 52.

Gilmore, The Ages of American Law at 80-81 (cited in note 64), citing the example of
Wesley Sturges (see note 10). David Strauss's course also pursues this theme after building on
the foundation described in the text accompanying note 64.
Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract60 (Ohio State 1974).
69
70 See Letters to Arthur L. Corbin (various dates), KLP at R, III, 15 (JRL) (cited in note
68
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oms-and all three (however green behind the ears) telling it
with explosive, atomic power. Did Bob Hutchins ever read an
opinion?71
In another letter two months later, Corbin recalled another incident from 1928 which restates his conviction from a positive standpoint:
Hamilton, Green, Sturges, and Hicks were there [at lunch]. After
eating, Fred Hicks turned to me and asked an obviously "loaded"
question: "Do you believe there is such a thing as a legal principle?" My reply: "Certainly I do. By this I don't mean something
handed down from the sky. Instead, I mean this: It is possible to
group together a number of similarcases (decisions) on which to
base a generalization that is usable, subject to change as new
cases appear with varying facts. That is the only kind of principle
that I know." Leon Green, quickly, in a surprised manner: "Why,
what you mean is a working rule." "Exactly that," I replied, "a
working rule." That ended the discussion. Hamilton and Sturges
said nothing. Hicks looked confused. The meeting broke up.72
For Corbin, the process of meticulously analyzing the facts and
results of cases, then trying to generate a workable rule, was the essence of legal scholarship; showing students how to discern the patterns of behavior beneath the surface rhetoric of opinions was at the
heart of law teaching. Llewellyn used vastly different rhetoric, calling
the process "the Grand Style" throughout his career, but essentially
marched in Corbin's footsteps. And, in many respects, so did Fritz
Kessler, whom Corbin said was "like a brother,"73 although his civil
law background brought different insights and concerns to the debate.
Edward Levi had little trouble aligning himself with the CorbinLlewellyn view of legal reasoning. Levi emphasized in his monograph
that the
kind of reasoning involved in the legal process is one in which
the classification changes as the classification is made. The rules
change as the rules are applied. More important, the rules arise
out of a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates
the rules and then applies them ....
A controversy as to whether

the law is certain, unchanging, and expressed in rules, or uncertain, changing, and only a technique for deciding specific cases
71 Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Karl N. Llewellyn (Dec 1,1960), KLP at R, III, 15
(JRL) (cited in note 53).
72 Letter from Arthur L. Corbin to Karl N. Llewellyn (Jan 29, 1961), KLP at R, III, 15

(JRL) (cited in note 53).
73
Id. But see Gilmore, 84 Yale L J at 674 (cited in note 8) (stating that despite Kessler's
"veneration" for Corbin, Kessler "ultimately parted company with, or went beyond, Corbin").
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misses the point. It is both.74
It is a testament to Levi's tact and ingenuity that he could work
closely and effectively from the very outset with Robert Maynard
Hutchins, whose views of the legal process, at least when he was most
deeply involved in it, were light-years from his own. It is true that
Hutchins changed over time -many thought opportunistically-but
in 1937 at the installation here of the new curriculum Hutchins declared, "No law professor can claim to be one if he separates himself
altogether from the 'realistic' movement."76 Like so many of his pronouncements at the time, his views are presented at such a general
level that it is difficult to pin down exactly what he thinks. That, in
part, is the value of Corbin's eyewitness testimony, at least for the period in which Hutchins was fully engaged in legal teaching and research.
However elusive Hutchins was, and is, the message of the CorbinLlewellyn-Levi(-Kessler) lesson was clear, whether conveyed adequately by the syllabus or not, and is captured by almost every lawyer's favorite poet, Wallace Stevens:
A. A violent order is disorder; and
B. A great disorder is an order. These
Two things are one."
Corbin communicated the point by enormous industry and lucidity for almost a half-century; Llewellyn by bombast, cajolery, and passionate insistence; Levi (and Kessler) by cold patience and incessant
questioning of the conventional wisdom. In the end, we all became
Realists to some degree, whether we appreciated it or not, and the
challenge of their successors in the classroom was to figure out what
to do with the realization. Llewellyn stated the challenge, almost as a
mantra, in his teaching materials and from the podium for generations: "Ideals without technique are a mess. But technique without
ideals is a menace."" As long as Elements of the Law remains in the
first-year curriculum, this I know: Whatever the course description,
the urgent issues Llewellyn reduced to an aphorism will remain at the
heart of the course.
Levi, An Introductionto Legal Reasoning at 3 (cited in note 28).
On his apostasy, see Robert Maynard Hutchins, No Friendly Voice (Chicago 1936), and
the critique by Max Radin, The Education of a Lawyer, 25 Cal L Rev 676, 688 (1937). Even
Frank eventually claimed to embrace the Neo-Thomism that Hutchins apparently took from
Mortimer Adler. See Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind xix-xx (Coward-McCann 1949).
76 Hutchins, 4 U Chi L Rev at 362 (cited in note 4).
77 Wallace Stevens, "Connoisseur of Chaos," in Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems of
Wallace Stevens 215 (Alfred A. Knopf 1954).
78
Llewellyn, 35 Colum L Rev at 662 (cited in note 49). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, After The Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harvard 1990) (epigraph).
74
75
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Activists Vote Twice
Joseph Isenberght

Judicial activism has a bipolar press. It is widely extolled, and
widely decried, often by the same people. Academic commentators see
it as pervasive, the de facto norm in judicial determinations. Rarely,
however, do they accept judicial activism with detached equanimity.
More often, when a high-profile decision cuts against their preferential grain, they denounce it; and when it promises to advance their favored vision of the future, they wax rhapsodic.
Critics of judicial activism assail it as a corruption of the judicial
function, a substitution of judicial will for the outcome of political
consensus, hence antimajoritarian and undemocratic. A refrain during
the Warren era was that the courts had usurped other functions of
government: they were running school systems, apportioning political
districts, fine-tuning law enforcement down to the very words read to
suspects, abetting the murder of innocent babies, and more. With shifting electoral tides and the alea of judicial mortality, the tune changed,
and was sung by a new chorus. In recent years, the courts have been
charged with "conservative activism." This charge impounds the additional vice of hypocrisy, because among the judges viewed as perpetrators of conservative activism are once and present proponents of judicial restraint.
What follow are some thoughts on judicial activism. To give them
focus, I will consider two recent Supreme Court decisions. One of
them, Bush v Gore, 531 US 98 (2000), was immediately identified as
an imperious stroke and demonized as judicial power run riot. The
case attracted the full battery of epithets often directed at judicial activism. A "judicial coup," "corrupt decision," are two that come to
mind. A dissenting Justice wrote that the decision would imperil the
"Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule
of law" (p 129).
The other decision, Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681 (1997), raised few
hackles on this score. It was noticed, to be sure, because the appellant
had a high public profile, but not especially as an instance of judicial
overreaching.

t
Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor in International Legal Studies, The University
of Chicago.
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In my view, these responses are no more than half right. Bush v
Gore does have hallmarks of an exercise in judicial activism. Quite
possibly, five Justices wanted to nail down their preferred candidate's
win in Florida. The legal theory propounded to this end is somewhat
tortured (although it would have delighted the decision's most ardent
critics had it favored someone they consider worthy). But Bush v
Gore pales next to Clinton v Jones as an extension of judicial power
beyond the legitimate bounds of law. The forensic manipulation in the
latter case, to boot, is more egregious.
In addition to dispeptic observations about these recent cases, I
have a broader point. The process of adjudication itself creates pressure toward judicial activism. The reason, as expounded more fully below, is that when activists and adherents of judicial restraint sit on the
same court, there is effectively a shift of power from the latter to the
former.
First, though, I should define the terrain. By judicial activism I
mean the decision of cases according to the judges' preferences. Its
opposite, for present purposes, is adjudication according to neutral
principles without regard for preference. An activist judge, in other
words, gives effect to preference over the objective meaning of the law
when they conflict. A neutralist follows the law without regard to personal preference. Other terms describing these approaches, although
with considerably different resonances, are "result orientation" and
"tendentiousness" for judicial activism, and "judicial restraint," "strict
constructionism," and "adjudication on the merits" for its opposite.
Here I will call the former "activism" or "preference," and the latter
"neutralism" or "adjudication on the merits." These terms surface periodically in judicial determinations and ubiquitously in academic
commentary.
An idea that flared briefly among legal academics in the 1970s
and 80s (and still flickers ever so faintly today) was that all judicial actions necessarily reflect ideology, temporal contingency, and confluences of class, race, sex, and childhood trauma. If this or something
similar is your world view - that is, you believe neutral adjudication on
the merits to be inherently impossible-you can stop reading now.
What follows will mean nothing to you. My postulate here is that in a
considerable number of cases there is an objectively neutral ground of
decision other than the judge's pure preference or ideological atavism.
Another way of putting this is that the proverbial intelligent Martian
who brought no preferences to bear (because the sort of thing that
shivers its timbers is out of this world) would conclude that some outcomes were more strongly supported by a discernible ground in law
than others.
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At the opposite pole from the academic postmodernists, judicial
activism itself does not wear its heart on its robe. The official, or at
least self-asserted, standard of judicial action acknowledges only objectively grounded determinations. Judges habitually profess to be
neutralists, and almost all would disavow naked preference as a fulcrum of decision. You will find in published opinions many more disclaimers like "I might prefer another outcome but the law compels
this one," than outbursts like "The law may compel another outcome
but, heck, I prefer this one." Academic folk, for their part, bring a
jaded wariness to proclamations of judicial neutrality, regarding them
(and there is ever-renewed grist for this view) as conventional pieties
of the sort that all express and none believes, akin to the main goal of
literary edification sometimes asserted by readers of men's magazines.
The question remains: why? Or more discursively, why is activism-preference, essentially-so common a basis of adjudication?

Some reasons come immediately to mind. People naturally accord
transcendent value to their own preferences and wouldn't want to
withhold their benefit from humanity. Perhaps too, as in the song,
judges just want to have fun. On an absolute scale, to be sure, judicial
activism may not be as much fun as, say, skydiving. But I have little
doubt that compared to the alternative of self-effacing pursuit of neutral grounds of adjudication, issuing judicial thunderbolts is more fun.
To observe human propensities, however, falls short of a systematic account of judicial activism. An additional and decisive element in
the story is the process of adjudication itself. A single judge who decided all cases might, unsurprisingly, allow personal preference to
shape their outcomes. But that would not be foreordained. This single
judge might have a strong conviction about judicial detachment, or
might derive satisfaction from hewing closely to neutral grounds of
decision. One could, to be sure, impute to such a judge a preference of
a sort-for judicial restraint-but the resulting body of decisions
would not have the look and feel of judicial activism.
In the actual process of adjudication, where appellate cases are
decided by several judges, a judge who subordinates preference to
neutral principles loses power to judges who are less restrained. This, I
believe, draws out judicial activism, which in any event is rarely far below the surface. To illustrate this point, consider the following schema.
Imagine a court with two judges, H. Dumpty and D. Quixote.
Judge Dumpty decides all cases according to his preferences (i.e., is an
unalloyed activist); Judge Quixote decides all cases on the merits (i.e.,
is a pure neutralist). Cases are decided by majority vote, which here
means unanimity. Cases where the two judges vote differently are resolved by coin toss.
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This array may strike you as so contrived as to be thoroughly
unilluminating. With some added texture, however, it is not unlike a
real tribunal. Imagine a nine-member court, on which four judges are
hardcore activists and four other judges strive toward neutral decisions. Further, the four activists have similar preferences across a
broad range of cases. The ninth judge is a wild card. This judge is
somewhat muddle-headed and finds it difficult to follow an analysis to
its conclusion, being easily diverted from a course of reasoning by
some extraneous and unpredictable element. There have been arrays
comparable to this on the United States Supreme Court within living
memory.
Returning to our imaginary two-judge court, suppose that of 100
cases, 50 have outcomes on the merits that match Judge Dumpty's
preferences while the other 50 have outcomes on the merits matching
Judge Quixote's. Judge Dumpty in all 100 cases votes his preferences.
Judge Quixote votes the same way in the 50 cases where the merits
and Judge Dumpty's preferences coincide. These 50 cases are therefore decided in accordance with Judge Dumpty's preferences. In the
other 50 cases (where Judge Dumpty's preferences and the merits diverge) Judge Quixote votes the other way, and the cases are decided
randomly, 25 for each side. Thus, of 100 cases, 75 are decided according
to the activist judge's preferences and only 25 according to the neutralist's. Judge Dumpty's preferences have determined the outcome of
many more cases than Judge Quixote's (who by hypothesis has subordinated his preferences to a neutral standard of decision).
As this simple matrix suggests, activists have more votes in effect
(or perhaps I should say more effective votes) when there are also
neutralists on the bench. This is what I mean by activists vote twice. It
is also why there are so few neutralists. Sooner or later Judge Quixote
will tire of tilting at Judge Dumpty's preferences, and start voting his
own. If we assume a more fully modulated environment, the pressures
remain the same. A pure rigorist cannot bargain or logroll. A judge
who unwaveringly pursues a neutral ground has nothing to trade. In
order to be a player, Judge Quixote must barter away some neutrality
for outcomes. It comes down to a matter of turf. If a judge who subordinates preference to neutral principles sits on the same bench with a
judge who always follows preference, the former loses ground to the
latter.
Adjudication by neutral principles, furthermore, gets little if any
reinforcement from academic quarters. Being inclined no less than
others to identify eternal verity with their own preferences, legal
scholars are quick to dispense adulation or contumely to judicial actions that advance or thwart their vision of the future. This kind of attention, even when adverse, is likely to reinforce judges' activist pro-
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pensities. Since most people like attention, it functions as a reward of
sorts for judicial activism. I don't want to make too much of this admittedly minor element, but at a minimum it seems likely that any influence from the academic world would sooner encourage than inhibit
a willful judge. Which is more plausible: that the majority Justices in
Bush v Gore, chastened by the outpouring of ink decrying their action
as lawless, become paragons of judicial restraint? or that in some future iteration of the same case, with the political colors of the parties
reversed, both the Justices' votes and the thrust of sidebar commentary are symmetrically reoriented?
Bush v Gore, in any event, was immediately and widely scourged
as the marquee instance of judges muscling their way to a favored
outcome. As I mentioned earlier, however, I think Clinton v Jones has
claim to higher billing in this regard.
Since Clinton v Jones has been largely eclipsed by later events, let
me remind readers that in that case the Supreme Court held unanimously that a sitting President is subject to a civil action brought by a
private person and accordingly to the associated arsenal of compulsory process. I have written on the merits of this question elsewhere
and will try to contain myself here. That said, I find both broadly structural and narrowly technical reasons for doubt on Clinton v Jones,
which seems to me weakly grounded both in law and common sense.
What is more, the decision is as good an illustration of judicial overreaching as I know.
First, the entire executive power of the United States resides in
the President. To expose the President personally to judicial compulsion (particularly at the instance of a private person) might prove a
serious impairment of that power. Unlike any other executive officer,
or a minister (even a premier) in a parliamentary system, the President cannot be replaced if subject to constraint by a court.
A narrower focus on the question adds force to this broad point.
It is hard to see how a civil action can proceed against the President,
ultimately, without the possibility of arrest and detention in the event
the President refuses to submit. If we assume to the contrary that a sitting President cannot be arrested or indicted -and that is the common
view of the matter-then a civil judgment and possible contempt citation are essentially hortatory. Or at least they are unless Congress impeaches. In one branch of corollaries, therefore, impeachment is the
backstop of private lawsuits against the President. If, on the other
hand, we accept the possibility implicit in Clinton v Jones that the
President is subject to arrest, indictment, and imprisonment, the consequences are more unnerving. Even if indicted or imprisoned, the
President is still the President, holding the full battery of powers including the pardon power. On this branch as well, therefore, lest the
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President spring himself from jail, Congress must impeach. All this to
make sure that some civil plaintiff-who in Clinton v Jones turned out
to be dangling on strings pulled by a cadre of ideologues - doesn't
have to wait until the end of the President's term to obtain satisfaction.
For reasons of this order, and others, it was obvious from the start
that a sitting President ought not routinely to be subject as an individual to judicial power. In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 the
debate on presidential impeachment is unfathomable without the essential predicate that the President personally is not subject to the
power of the courts. A generation later this was still common ground,
as revealed by an observation of Joseph Story in his Commentaries on
the Constitution. In order to give the Supreme Court its due, let me
present Story's comment exactly as the Court does in Clinton v Jones:
Story wrote that because the President's "incidental powers"
must include "the power to perform [his duties], without any obstruction," he "cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of
his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in
civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability" (pp 695-96
n 23).
It would be hard to make the point more straightforwardly, or more
strongly. Story accords to the President's person an official inviolability in civil cases. That means no civil actions, doesn't it? Apparently
not, after the Court works its way. The Court slaps Story right into
line:
Story said only that "an official inviolability,"... was necessary to

preserve the President's ability to perform the functions of the
office; he did not specify the dimensions of the necessary immunity. While we have held that an immunity from suits grounded
on official acts is necessary to serve this purpose ... it does not

follow that the broad immunity from all civil damages suits that
petitioner seeks is also necessary (Id).
Thus we are to understand Story's reference to the "official inviolability" of the President's person "in civil cases" as leaving the President
subject to private lawsuits because "official inviolability" does "not
specify the dimensions of the necessary immunity." You could have
fooled me. Without the Court's explanation I would have understood
Story's terms as specifying exactly the dimensions of the necessary
immunity. It is absolute, because inviolability is an absolute. And I am
not the only one who understands inviolability in this manner. Hamilton, in Federalist 69 describes the King of England as "inviolable,"
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